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ESSAY
THE PLACE OF FORMALISM
IN LEGAL THEORY
MICHAEL CORRADO*
I understand formalism to be the claim that law is an autonomous
area of knowledge. To say that it is autonomous is to say that it is self-
contained, that it is not dependent on other areas of knowledge like mo-
rality or politics or sociology. In particular it is to say that law is not
reducible to those other areas, in a sense of reducibility I will try to make
clear.
There is a version of formalism that is true. This version of formal-
ism does not claim that law is unrelated to other areas of knowledge. It
admits that legal argument makes use of moral, political, and sociologi-
cal information. But it insists that, although much that is extra-legal is
taken into account in deciding a question of law, it remains extra-legal; it
does not become part of the law.'
I. THE AUTONOMY OF LAW
Interest in logic as a philosophical instrument has taken two differ-
ent and mutually exclusive forms over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury. It has found expression, on the one hand, in the attempt to use the
machinery of symbolic logic to show that all knowledge can be "re-
duced" to a basis-some small set of elementary or primitive terms and
propositions involving those terms-a project known as reductionism.
The manifestations of this attempt are logical empiricism, logical beha-
viorism, logicism in mathematics, and emotivism and naturalism in eth-
ics. Each of these, if successful, would contribute to the larger goal of
universal reduction of all knowledge. If the reduction is epistemological
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. 1965,
B.S. 1966, Pennsylvania State University; A.M. 1968, Ph.D 1970, Brown University; J.D.
1984, University of Chicago.
1. Ernest Weinrib defended a version of formalism in Legal Formalism: On the Imma-
nent Rationality of the Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). In addition to coming out of a philo-
sophical tradition different from the one in which this Essay is based, Weinrib's position differs
in significant ways from the one presented here. As I understand him, Weinrib believes that
the internal logic of the law determines what the law ought to be, or how legal terms ought to
apply to the facts. See id. at 1012-14.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in nature, meant to duplicate the structure of knowledge, then the terms
of the basis will be phenomenal or sense-data predicates.
The other form this interest in logic has taken is the attempt to for-
malize and systematize autonomous areas of knowledge, without reduc-
ing them to one another. For each such area the aim is to provide a set
of primitive terms and primitive propositions which would generate all
the relevant terms and conceptual truths of that area, and which could be
applied to the available factual information in that area.2 The classic
(but incomplete) example of such a systematization is Euclid's geometry,
and in the last century a number of areas of mathematics were so
formalized.
In this century philosophers have applied the method to discrete
areas of philosophical interest, and there are studies of the internal logic
of the modalities (necessity, possibility, impossibility); of obligations; of
knowledge and belief, of semantic relations; of evidentiary relations; and
so on. Take, for example, the modalities: necessity, possibility, impossi-
bility. Philosophers have shown not only how to define "possibility" and
"impossibility" in terms of necessity, but also how to define implicitly
different senses of "necessity" by means of axiom sets.3 (Such a study
might just as easily start with possibility or even impossibility as primi-
tive; but whatever the primitive term is will have to be characterized by
2. A primitive term is an undefined term. A primitive proposition is a proposition from
which other propositions in the relevant area of study are derivable, and which is not itself
derivable. The various terms of geometry are defined, ultimately, by means of certain primi-
tive terms that are not themselves defined. To suppose every term in the system could be
defined would be to presuppose a certain circularity; there must be a stopping point to defini-
tion. This point of view supposes that something similar is true of the propositions that deline-
ate the conceptual part of a discipline as well. Not every proposition in geometry can be
proved; we must start with unprovable axioms and postulates.
3. A nice, informal introduction to the logic of the modalities can be found in ARTHUR
N. PRIOR, TIME AND MODALITY (1957). The syntax and semantics of the various systems of
"modal logic" have been worked out in some detail. Although the study of formal modality
dates back at least to the Stoics, see BENSON MATES, STOIC LOGIC (2d prtg. 1961), much of
the recent work had its origin in C.I. Lewis's attempt to work out the logic of counterfactual
conditionals. One of the simpler systems of logic he worked with had axioms and rules that
roughly correspond to the following:
Proposition One. If something is necessarily true, then it is true in fact.
Proposition Two. If a second thing necessarily follows from a first, and the first thing
is necessarily true, then the second thing is necessarily true.
Rule of Inference. If something is a true proposition of this system, then it is a
necessarily true proposition of this system.
A number of stronger systems can be built using this as a base. Where necessity is taken as
primitive, a proposition is impossible if it is necessarily false, and a proposition ispossibly true if
it is not necessarily false. See CLARENCE I. LEWIS & COOPER H. LANGFORD, SYMBOLIC
LOGIC 122-98 (2d ed. Dover 1959) (1932).
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means of axioms.) The definitions and axioms are "internal" to the study
of modalities; they characterize the meaning of (or at least the structure
of the proper use of) the terms. They do not, however, determine the
application of the modalities in the real world.
The question of how the modalities are applied in the world-what
things are really necessary and which are merely possible and so on-is
the subject of a different sort of study. The principles that relate modal
terms to nonmodal terms ("If A causes B, then the proposition that
things like A are followed by things like B is necessarily true"4) may be
called "bridge" statements. Similarly, in moral philosophy statements
relating moral terms to one another and characterizing the use of moral
terms by means of axioms are internal statements, and are sometimes
called metaethical principles. They are supposed to be conceptual
truths-true in virtue of the meanings of the words involved. But the
bridge statements of ethics-the claims of act-utilitarianism that right-
ness and wrongness are determined by happiness and suffering, for exam-
ple-are substantive principles and cannot be determined just by
studying the meanings of the words.5 Or so at least a "formalism" in
ethics would claim.
I will preface the discussion that follows by saying that although the
attempt at universal reduction has been convincingly shown to be impos-
sible, the attempt to formalize autonomous areas of knowledge is still
very much alive. Though only a small minority of professional philoso-
phers cultivate it in symbolic form, it is informally practiced by many.6
4. Notice that Hume would reject this claim. For Hume, as he is usually understood,
causation is a contingent relation between events. That is, even in a case in which one event
follows another and we are inclined to say the first causes the second, the first does not necessi-
tate the second; it might have been otherwise.
5. There is an informal discussion of the distinction in Alvin I. Goldman, What is Justi-
fied Belief?, in EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY'
171, 171-73 (Paul K. Moser ed., 1986).
6. William Parent, for example, wrote at the beginning of an article on privacy:
Defining privacy requires a familiarity with its ordinary usage, of course, but this is
not enough since our common ways of talking and using language are riddled with
inconsistencies, ambiguities, and paradoxes. What we need is a definition which is by
and large consistent with ordinary language, so that capable speakers of English will
not be genuinely surprised that the term "privacy" should be defined in this way, but
which also enables us to talk consistently, clearly, and precisely about the family of
concepts to which privacy belongs.
W.A. Parent, Privacy, Morality, and the Law, 12 PHIL. & AFF. 269, 269 (1983). In this pas-
sage we can find attitudes common to this sort of philosophy: rejection of a blind reliance on
ordinary language, the notion of a family of related concepts, and the emphasis on clarity. The
most brilliant and inspiring practitioner of the formal approach may have been A.N. Prior.
See supra note 3.
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A. Universal Reduction
In The Logical Structure of the World,7 Rudolf Camap gave a very
precise meaning to empiricism and then tried to show that empiricism as
he defined it is true. He proposed to show that all meaningful sentences
could be reduced to primitive propositions involving only logical con-
stants and predicates of sensory awareness (like "appears red" or "has a
square appearance"). Reduction was to be a kind of translation; if a sen-
tence involving claims about one sort of thing could be translated into a
sentence or set of sentences about other sorts of things, then talk about
the first sort of thing would be said to be reducible to talk about the
second sort of thing.8 If such translation were possible for every sentence
about entities of a certain sort, then we could do without talk about those
entities entirely. Moreover, we could also retain words for the first sort
of entity once the reduction was complete; to talk about entities of the
first sort would be perceived as simply shorthand for talk about entities
of the second sort.'
To give a common-sense sort of example, the fact that we talk about
"the average person" would lead to some odd consequences if we did not
realize that such talk was just shorthand for talk about the totality of
persons. To explain it to someone who did not understand it, we might
offer a "reduction schema": to say that the average person has a certain
property to degree F is to say that if we added up the amount of that
7. RUDOLF CARNAP, THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD & PSEUDOPROBLEMS
IN PHILOSOPHY (Rolf A. George trans., University of Cal. Press 1967) (1928).
8. "A concept is said to be reducible to others, if all statements about it can be trans-
formed into statements about these other concepts; the general rule for this transformation of
statements for a given concept is called the construction of the concept." Id. at 15. Carnap did
not suppose that the possibility of logical construction answered any "metaphysical" questions
at all. The fact that all talk about human beings could be reduced to talk about physical
objects, which could further be reduced to talk about elementary experiences, did not mean
that human beings did not exist.
9. This is a loose, but I hope not inaccurate, paraphrase of what Carnap said he was
doing. Here is his description of the move from the basic experiences ("elementary exper-
iences") to the logical construction of physical objects:
To begin with, we shall discuss the method of constructing three-dimensional, physi-
cal space .... and then we shall carry out this construction as well as the construc-
tion of the visual things which depend upon it .... For the constructional system,
the most important visual thing is my body .... It will help us to give definite
descriptions of the various senses, so that with its aid we can supplement the domain
of the autopsychological .... Then we shall describe the construction of the world of
perception ... as well as the construction of the world ofphysics ... , which is quite
different from the former. Finally we shall discuss some physical objects ([e.g.,] per-
sons.. .), which are required for the subsequent construction of the heteropsycho-
logical objects.
Id. at 191. Heteropsychological objects, which are to be constructed logically on the basis of
physical objects, include an intersubjective world, cultural objects, and values. Id. at 214.
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property that all persons have, and then divided the total by the total
number of persons, we would get F. But there is nothing wrong with
retaining the locution "the average person" as a kind of shorthand. Simi-
larly, if the project sketched out in The Logical Structure of the World
succeeded, we could see all our talk about the world and the things in it
as shorthand for more complicated talk about sense-data.
The model for this sort of reduction was the enormous enterprise
undertaken by Russell and Whitehead of reducing mathematics to logic,
an enterprise known as "logicism."' 10 Logicism had been entertained as a
possibility for centuries; what Russell and Whitehead undertook to do
was to use the machinery of modern symbolic logic to show that one area
of mathematics after another could be reduced to logic. What that
meant in practice was that they provided definitions of the terms of
mathematics in purely logical terms, and then attempted to show that all
the truths of mathematics could be derived from truths of logic."'
Carnap's aim was to carry this program through the entire body of
human knowledge, adding to the logical terms only sense-data predi-
cates. The world was to be structured into sets of propositions of varying
levels of complexity: statements of social-cultural fact were to be reduci-
ble to statements about the mental events of human beings; statements
about the mental events of human beings were to be reduced to state-
ments about physical entities; and statements about physical objects were
to be reduced to statements about sensory information.
Carnap's empiricism failed, which is to say, for example, that
sentences about human beings could not be reduced to sentences about
physical objects without remainder-something irreducibly human
would always be left over. This discovery was made possible by the pre-
cision with which Carnap and others formulated the thesis of reducibil-
ity, and it is one of the things about which it is possible to say that
philosophy has reached a conclusion. There are two ways to respond to
this discovery." The philosopher could deny any significance to the bit
10. See BERTRAND RUSSELL & ALFRED N. WHITEHEAD, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA
(1910).
11. Here is a simple example: To say that there are three pigs, it suffices to say that there
is something X which is a pig, and something Y which is a pig, and something W which is a
pig, and that X is not identical with Ynor with W, nor is Yidentical with W The postulation
of the entity X and the others is a logical notion as is identity in the logical system of Russell
and Whitehead, and indeed in all contemporary logical systems. To say that three pigs and
two geese make five farm animals, if pigs and geese are farm animals, requires us to say that if
there are three pigs (translated as above) and there are two geese (translated in a similar way),
then if pigs and geese are farm animals there are five farm animals (translated in a similar
way). And this last is a truth of logic.
12. I do not share the trendy view that philosophy does not progress, but only "changes
the subject" from time to time. It is the achievement of Carnap and his colleagues to have set
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left over; that was Quine's way in Word and Object.13 Or the philosopher
could come to the conclusion that biology and psychology are autono-
mous and irreducible areas of knowledge, and set out to uncover the in-
ternal logic of these areas.
B. The Autonomy of the Law
This sketch makes a fairly precise definition of autonomy possible:
An area A is reducible to an area B if the terms of A can be defined
entirely by means of the terms of B (along with purely logical terms), and
if, with terms so defined, the conceptual truths of A turn out to be truths
of B. In the context of reduction, terms which cannot be further reduced
are called primitive terms. An area A is autonomous with respect to B if
it is not reducible to B. Every autonomous area will have its own primi-
tive terms. If biology is autonomous with respect to physics, then there
will be some biological primitives; not everything true of biology will be
translatable into purely physical terms.
Morality is an interesting case. From the outset Carnap and others
conceded that the sentences used in moral discourse could not be re-
duced to sentences involving only logical and phenomenal predicates.
Rather than take morality as a counterexample to the feasibility of reduc-
tion, emotivists declared it to be without meaning: the sentences of mo-
rality were said not to convey any knowledge, but really to express
emotions the way the expression "Hurrah!" might be used to express an
emotion. Those who believe on the contrary that moral discourse does
the stage for the dramatic discovery that philosophical behaviorism and phenomenalism could
not work, just as Russell and Whitehead showed that a simple and straightforward sort of
logicism could not work.
13. But there remains a thesis of Brentano's . . . that is directly relevant to our
emerging doubts over the propositional attitudes [eg., "John believes that.. ."] and
other intentional locutions. It is roughly that there is no breaking out of the inten-
tional vocabulary by explaining its members in other terms.... Even indirect quota-
tion, for all its tameness in comparison with other idioms of propositional attitude,
and for all its concern with overt speech behavior, seems insusceptible to general
reduction to behavioral terms .... And when we turn to belief sentences the diffi-
culty is doubled....
One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of
intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of... [statements
about the mental], or as showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emp-
tiness of [such a science]....
... If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical
scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct quotation and
no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of
organisms.
WILLARD V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 220-21 (1960).
1550 [Vol. 70
LEGAL FORMALISM
convey information take its irreducibility as signifying its autonomy, and
(if they are so inclined) might press on to formulate a set of primitives
that would permit the definition of the important terms of morality.
14
How does all this relate to law? The claim of the modest version of
formalism I am advocating is that legal discourse forms an autonomous
area of knowledge, and that the sentences or propositions of the law can-
not be reduced to sentences or propositions of any other area at all.
What it does not claim is that legal propositions are unrelated to proposi-
tions of other sorts, or that information from other fields is irrelevant to
legal conclusions.
Consider the analogy with moral discourse. To say that morality is
autonomous is to say that statements about right and wrong are not re-
ducible to, say, statements about people suffering; to say that killing is
wrong doesn't just amount to saying that killing makes people suffer. At
the same time, suffering is not unrelated to judgments about right and
wrong: it is wrong to make people suffer without justification. Without
making use of the controversial distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic statements, we may agree that moral terms bear a type of relation-
ship to each other that they do not bear to nonmoral terms.15 Statements
about what actions are morally required may be replaced by statements
about what actions it is morally wrong not to do, for example, without
any loss in significance; and the statement, "What is morally required it
would be morally wrong not to do," we may call an internal statement in
moral discourse: it defines one ethical term by means of another. On the
other hand, the claim that creating suffering is morally wrong is not of
that sort. We may call it a bridge statement: it connects a moral term
with a term descriptive of human feelings.
The internal statements of morality are therefore the statements that
relate moral notions one to the other and those that delineate the logic of
moral notions. The bridge statements of morality are those that relate
14. There are three positions a nonreductionist might take on this further aim of systema-
tization: (1) You might optimistically look forward to the systematic analysis of every autono-
mous field, with primitive terms and axiomatic propositions, on the pattern of geometry; (2)
You might argue that such an aim is mistaken in areas other than logic, and is a waste of time;
or (3) You might see such work as productive, even if it does not succeed in the end. Just as
Carnap furthered knowledge in his unsuccessful attempt to reduce all knowledge to experience
statements, so the unsuccessful attempt at the rigorous formulation of autonomous areas will
lead to deeper knowledge of those areas. For example, consider the work of the last 25 years
on deontic logic (the logic of obligation statements) and the logic of knowledge and belief.
15. If we were to use this controversial distinction, of course, we might say that the inter-
nal statements of an area are analytically true (true in virtue of the meanings of their terms)
and that bridge statements are synthetic and a priori. Doubts about the distinction are ex-
pressed in WILLARD V.0. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF
Viaw 20, 20-37 (2d ed. rev. 1980).
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moral notions to nonmoral notions. To say that morality is autonomous
is not to say that moral claims are unrelated to physical, or psychologi-
cal, or sociological claims. It is to say that no set of bridge statements
will provide a definition for any moral term, and that moral terms are
not, therefore, reducible to nonmoral terms.
16
Similarly, we may distinguish between statements internal to the law
and bridge statements. An example of the first might be the statement
that there is no criminal liability for actions that are legally justified.
This statement is conceptually true-true in virtue of the very meaning
of the terms involved in it. An example of the second might be that an
action is legally justified if it was carried out in self-defense.1 The truth
of this statement, in those jurisdictions in which it is true, does not follow
from the meaning of the terms involved. The challenge is to show that
these are in fact different sorts of statements in the law, that legal notions
cannot be defined by way of nonlegal terms in bridge statements, and
that therefore the law is irreducible and autonomous in the same sense in
which morality is autonomous. I will consider just two sorts of reduction
here, but I think my argument can be extended to any proposed
reduction.
First, propositions of law cannot be reduced to propositions of mo-
16. Consider G.E. Moore's objection to "naturalism." G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA E'THICA
18-21 (1903). Moore was a utilitarian; he believed the proposition that an action is right if it
produces more good than any alternative action. If both "right" and "good" are understood
as moral terms, then the proposition that Moore believed is an internal moral proposition. On
the other hand, the further claim that the happiness of human beings constitutes the good is a
bridge principle, relating a moral term ("good") to a nonmoral term ("happiness"). It is or
aspires to be a bridge principle. What Moore referred to as the naturalistic fallacy was the
belief that the meaning of "good" could be given by such nonmoral terms as "happiness," and
that what I have called bridge principles could be used to define moral terms. If such terms
could be defined that way, then all moral talk could be replaced by equivalent nonmoral talk;
we could replace talk about the good with talk about happiness. Moore's "open question"
argument was intended to show that morality is autonomous and not reducible to talk about
some other thing. Moore argued that if "good" just meant "happiness," then it would make
no sense to ask whether happiness was good; since it does make sense, one cannot be defined in
terms of the other. This is the sort of argument that persuades those who are already per-
suaded. Id
17. Naturally many examples are going to be harder than these to classify. Consider
"Provocation is not a defense to murder." That appears to be an internal sentence linking the
legal notion of provocation with the legal notion of a defense to murder. Yet it might well vary
in truth value from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; there is nothing to stop a court or a legislature
from making provocation a defense. Is this an internal sentence that varies in truth value? Or
is it not an internal sentence? I think that the answer is that it is not internal, and that provo-
cation is not a legal notion. This is a bridge statement, connecting the facts (or nonlegal norm)
of provocation with the legal notion of a defense. The sentence in question makes a significant
factual claim. Internal statements, like tautological statements, have universal application pre-
cisely because they have so little to say. They will typically have to do with relating and
distinguishing legal concepts.
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rality. The simple reduction of law to morality would yield a very sim-
ple-minded sort of natural law theory indeed. Not everything that ought
to be the case is, or even ought to be, law. A more perceptive version of
natural law theory is this: That what is the law and what ought to be the
law are the same thing. But that claim is false as well-certainly it is
false as a claim about the meaning of legal statements. There are laws
that simply ought not to be laws; but even if there were not, the mere
possibility that there might be is enough to defeat a meaning claim.
Moreover, the claim does not propose a genuine reduction: the relevant
moral propositions involve reference to the law essentially ("what ought
to be the law"), so that there is no reduction of legal statements.
Second, legal statements cannot be reduced to statements descriptive
of institutional facts. For example, it might be proposed that to say that
some statement is the law is just to say that it has been uttered under the
appropriate circumstances by the appropriate body-and perhaps the ap-
propriate circumstances and the appropriate body are in part identified
by the attitude of the governed toward them. But although such a proce-
dure may be useful in identifying the bridge statements that govern the
application of legal concepts in a particular jurisdiction, it says nothing
whatever about the internal statements of the law. The truth of such
internal statements does not depend on any facts about the production of
law in a particular place at a particular time.
For example, it is true in every jurisdiction that whoever is justified
in his actions is not criminally liable. That is just part of the machinery
that societies bring into play when they implement a system of criminal
law-it is part of what it means to have a criminal law system. It is up to
the legislating body whether anything at all will justify, and therefore not
only may what justifies in one society differ from what justifies in an-
other, but there could well be societies in which nothing justifies at all.
And it is a normative question, of course, what ought to justify (in any
given jurisdiction). But to say that something is justified entails that
there will be no criminal liability.
This has nothing to do, of course, with the words used in particular
jurisdictions. It is possible that the word "justification" may be used in
some jurisdiction to connote some other concept entirely, and we should
not expect that concept to be involved in the same relations our notion of
justification is involved in. In fact part of the benefit of identifying the
internal part of the law is to enable us to identify the correlative elements
of the law of different jurisdictions by focusing on the relations each ele-
ment enters into rather than the words used. Such translation from one
jurisdiction to another, someone is sure to point out, cannot depend en-
tirely on structural similarities; there will have to be some starting point,
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some concepts we can translate from one jurisdiction to another without
reference to structural relations. But that problem is a universal one, and
should not detain us here.
I conclude that there is an area of legal knowledge that is not reduci-
ble to institutional facts. Although societies are free to create whatever
institutions they wish, not every such institution will count as a legal
system. A legal system cannot maintain that someone who is justified is
criminally liable, and if there is an institution that does so, it is not a legal
system. (I would prefer not to get hung up on a particular example,
because there naturally will be some controversy about what belongs to
the internal realm. If you do not accept the point about justification and
liability, consider an institution that found only people who are legally
innocent, in our sense, to be criminally liable, in our sense. I will not
speculate about whether such a system could be maintained, but it would
not be a system of criminal law.)
The distinction between internal statements and bridge statements
thus sets off a realm-the internal legal realm-that is the particular
province of the legal scholar. The study of bridge statements, on the
other hand, is the province the legal scholar shares with the political
scientist, the economist, the philosopher, and others. The internal realm
marks off a descriptive study whose truths should not vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction. Wherever there is justification in the law, it relieves
criminal liability; should there be something called justification in some
jurisdiction that does not relieve liability, then it is not justification at all
but something else. If we want to know what that jurisdiction does with
justification, we must look for the appropriate concept, whatever it is
called there. The same is not true with the particular grounds of justifi-
cation, which might vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; "lesser evils"
might provide a justification in one jurisdiction but not in others. That is
a normative decision made on policy grounds or moral grounds, and it
may be a correct decision and it may not.
Thus it is possible to distinguish three separate studies: the descrip-
tive study of internal statements, which should not vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction; the descriptive study of bridge statements, which will
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and the normative study of bridge
statements, the study of what the true bridge statements in a jurisdiction
ought to be. If you believe that the acceptability of a bridge statement
can be considered in isolation, then you may believe that the same bridge
statements ought to be true in all jurisdictions. But if you believe (what
is more likely to be true) that the desirability of any given bridge state-
ment depends on the body of bridge statements it belongs to in the juris-
diction in which it occurs, then it may be that the normative study will
1554 [Vol. 70
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point to different bridge statements in different jurisdictions. I repeat
that the descriptive and normative studies of the bridge statements would
seem to presuppose some clarity about the formal relations among legal
concepts.
C. Some Observations
(1) This description of formalism is merely a programme or a
promissory note. The description does not attempt to identify particu-
larly legal notions and distinguish them from the nonlegal, and clearly if
it has not done that it has not performed the subsequent task of relating
the legal notions to one another. There are two ways that we might set
out to fulfill the promise. The first would be to try to formulate an entire
logical system of legal expressions, working, so to speak, from the top
down. Such a desire for systematization seems more Continental than
Anglo-American. The other way would be to work at it piecemeal,
marking off limited parts of the field to be worked at any one time. The
choice between these two is a matter of taste, I think, and it may be
worthwhile to have both sorts of endeavor going on at once. I must con-
fess that the second of the two ways has more appeal for me, and I will
undertake to provide an example of it in the second half of this Essay.
(2) Looking at things in terms of this distinction between internal
and bridge statements throws some light on discussions in legal theory.
For one thing, the formalism I have described is a genuine formalism,
entailing as it does the autonomy of the law and the existence of a specifi-
cally legal realm of investigation. At the same time, it is not inconsistent
with legal realism, since the existence of the bridge statements provides a
connection between the law and other disciplines. For example, the ob-
servation a judge might make that it is legally unreasonable to require a
marginal expenditure on care that exceeds the expected marginal gain in
cost reduction is an example of a bridge statement, and it has the place in
legal argument usually claimed for it by realists. On the other hand,
internal statements connecting reasonableness and care with liability are
required for any such argument to go through to an interesting legal
conclusion.
(3) Formalism of this sort has nothing to say about the possibility
of mechanical jurisprudence, a view expressed by Beccaria in the follow-
ing paragraph:
Judges in criminal cases cannot have the authority to interpret
laws, and the reason, again, is that they are not legislators....
For every crime that comes before him, a judge is required
to complete a perfect syllogism in which the major premise
must be the general law; the minor, the action that conforms or
19921 1555
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
does not conform to the law; and the conclusion, acquittal or
punishment."'
The idea that laws made by human beings could cover every contin-
gency, so that the only job for the judge is to pick out the applicable
statute or precedent and apply it, deserves the abuse that it has gotten.
Formalism does not entail this idea, but does not rule it out either. The
bridge statements are rules of application created by courts or legisla-
tures, and there is no reason to suppose that they cover every conceivable
case, or even that they are not sometimes inconsistent. The internal
statements, on the other hand, do not dictate the application of legal
concepts.
(4) Traditional formalism is sometimes identified with natural law
theory, which cannot be the case with the version I have described: if
law is by definition a branch of morality, then it is not an autonomous
discipline. Neither should formalism be identified with positivism, how-
ever; positivism has to do with the relationship between the descriptive
study of bridge statements and the normative study of bridge statements.
If positivism is true, then what is a bridge statement in a particular juris-
diction and what ought to be a bridge statement in that jurisdiction will
be two different things.
II. THE FORMAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION
AND ExCUSE
Though this version of formalism makes claims that are very mod-
est, its importance should not be underestimated. Discussions of legal
theory may be confounded by failure to make the appropriate distinc-
tions. I offer the example of the recent attempt to distinguish justifica-
tion from excuse in criminal law. It is not so much that the distinction
between internal and bridge statements can solve that problem as that
this distinction can clarify just what the problem is.
An action violating the criminal law will not result in punishment if
the action is justified or if the action is excused. Justified actions are
sometimes said to be actions that we find desirable, like acting in self-
defense; excused actions are actions that are not desirable but whose un-
desirability for one reason or another we cannot attribute to the actor, as
in the case of insanity. There are other ways of marking the distinction
between the two: for example, justification involves the objective right-
ness of the action, excuse the subjective state of the actor.
Kent Greenawalt has argued that various attempts to distinguish




between the two notions must fail.' 9 He has taken these attempts, in-
cluding the two mentioned above, and has argued that each such attempt
stumbles over the facts about what counts as justification and what
counts as excuse. For example, the claim that justification looks to what
is objective and excuse to what is subjective ignores the fact that in most
jurisdictions justification depends upon the actor's perception of things,
as well as the fact that the excuse of duress depends upon an objective
standard: not what this actor is capable of, but what a person of ordi-
nary firmness would be capable of. The claim that justification involves
morally right actions while excuse involves morally permissible actions
gets hung up on the difficulties of distinguishing between what is right
and what is merely permissible.2"
The problem is that many of the attempts Greenawalt discusses are
apparently attempts to distinguish the bridge statements involving justifi-
cation from the bridge statements involving excuse. The important point
is that there is no necessary reason why the bridge statements-the prin-
ciples of application of the terms-must differ and may not overlap. A
particular jurisdiction may not distinguish the application of justification
from the application of excuse, for example. Then of course there would
be no clear line between the two sets of bridge statements. It does not
follow that the concepts are not distinct or distinguishable, any more
than the fact that "human being" and "featherless biped" may apply to
all the same things implies that the two concepts are not distinct. Thus,
when bridge statements are at issue, the enterprise is doomed to fail at
the start.
Take the attempt to distinguish the two on a subjective/objective
basis. It is a contingent matter, and up to the lawmaker, whether any
particular jurisdiction will set an objective or a subjective standard for
either justification or excuse. Jurisdictions will vary on their answer to
this issue, and it is useless to suppose that the answer will provide a dis-
tinguishing mark between justification and excuse. Again, take the ques-
tion whether justification applies only when the defendant chooses the
lesser of the available evils. That cannot be a universal mark distinguish-
ing justification from excuse since it is clearly up to the legislature
whether that fact should justify at all or whether some lower standard is
appropriate for justification.
19. Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897, 1899-1903 (1984).
20. For some reason that is not clear to me, Greenawalt seems to pull back from the
initial intent of his article, which was apparently to show that it is impossible to draw a clear
line between the two notions. Instead, he draws a more modest conclusion about what it is
worthwhile for courts to be doing. Id. at 1927.
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It is a different matter, I suppose, if the writers criticized by Greena-
walt saw themselves involved in the normative criticism of bridge state-
ments. If these writers are attempting to determine what the distinction
between justification bridge statements and excuse bridge statements
ought to be, then it is possible (though, as I have already observed, not
necessary) that they might be looking for something that is the same in
all jurisdictions. Nevertheless, even if they discover considerable overlap
between justification and excuse in this regard, or find that there is no
normative bridge characteristic that definitively distinguishes them, it
does not follow that there is no formal distinction. And in fact the for-
mal distinction is what the investigator must already have in hand when
he begins either his descriptive or normative investigation of bridge prin-
ciples. He must be able to locate in different jurisdictions those notions
that we label justification and excuse.
The first appropriate search, therefore, is for the formal or internal
distinction between justification and excuse. One of the distinctions dis-
cussed by Greenawalt seems to me to be of that sort. Fletcher and
Robinson proposed that one's action is justified only if no one would be
justified in resisting it, whereas one's action may be excused even though
someone would be justified in resisting it.21 Though this is a properly
formal distinction-relating as it does the legality of one action with the
legality of another-it is apparently simply false. For if it were true, then
no one would be justified in resisting what reasonably appears to him to
be unwarranted aggression simply because it does so appear to him. It
must also in fact be unwarranted aggression. If the appearance of aggres-
sion were sufficient, as I think it is, then both parties might be justified,
21. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.1.1, at 759-62 (1978);
Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal
Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rv. 266, 277-78 (1975). I feel sure that Fletcher and Robinson would
reject the characterization of their work as formalistic. Nevertheless, some of the things
Fletcher has to say about his own work and Robinson's suggest, at least partly, that this is the
direction to be pursued. Fletcher said approvingly, for example:
[Robinson] starts from a construction of the criminal law as a received set of princi-
ples that ought to be binding on our deliberations when conduct should be punished.
The authority for these principles is not their instrumental value, but their grounding
in a theory of just punishment implicit in the patterns of liability that have accrued in
the common law.
George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23
UCLA L. REv. 293, 294 (1975) (emphasis added). Fletcher and Robinson clearly were not
talking about something that happens to be true in different jurisdictions; and since they find it
in the common law, neither can they argue that what they want is something that necessarily
ought to be true in all jurisdictions, for that doesn't follow from the fact that it is in the
common law. Insofar as they are clear about what they are looking for, it seems to me, they
are looking for a formal distinction.
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the first in attacking and the second in resisting, and according to the
Fletcher-Robinson criterion that is conceptually impossible.
Another attempt depends on certain modal legal notions. We may
say of a certain state of affairs that it is legally required to occur, that it is
legally permitted to occur, or that it is legally forbidden.22 And we might
say that an action is justified if it is legally required, while an action is
excused only if it is legally permitted, justification engendering our ap-
proval, excuse only our indulgence. Unfortunately, however, this also
cannot be so. If a state of affairs is legally required, then its omission is
legally prohibited. In the case of a justified action, to perform the legal
action instead of the justified illegal action would be to omit the justified
action, and if the justified action is required, that means that the legal
action is legally forbidden. That cannot be the case. Whoever performs
a justified action would have been entitled to perform the legal action
instead. Both are permitted to him. Moreover, there may have been
more than one action in a particular set of circumstances that would
have been justified; but if a justified action is a required action, there can
only be one justified action.
Let me propose, as a first approximation, a formal distinction be-
tween justification and excuse that involves a variation on the modal pro-
posal and entails elements of the Fletcher-Robinson proposal as well.
The proposal is this:
A's action is justified if and only if it occurs in circumstances
(including the state of mind of the actor) such that anyone who
performs it in those circumstances ought not, legally, to be pun-
ished; and the occurrence of the action is legally preferable, in
the circumstances, to the occurrence of the legal alternative.
This distinction entails as much of the Fletcher-Robinson resistance the-
sis as is warranted: because the occurrence of the justified act is prefera-
ble to its nonoccurrence if the circumstances are as A believes them to be
(A's beliefs being one of the circumstances to be taken into account), the
prevention of the justified act by someone who believes the circumstances
to be as A believes them to be cannot also be justified. This is because the
occurrence of the act and the prevention of the act cannot both be pre-
ferred in the same set of circumstances.
Moreover, to be preferable is different from being required: if an act
is preferable in certain circumstances, its omission may still be permissi-
ble. Thus, even if breaking the law is justified it does not follow that
22. If we add that the state of affairs might be legally permitted not to occur, then we have
a set of four predicates that fit into a classical logical structure known at least since Aristotle's
time: the square of opposition.
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obeying the law would be forbidden; it may well be permissible. And of
course, unlike actions that are required, more than one action may be
preferable to obeying the law.
In contrast:
A's action is excused if and only if it occurs in circumstances
(including the state of mind of the actor) such that anyone who
performs it in those circumstances ought not, legally, to be pun-
ished, and the occurrence of the action in those circumstances
is not legally preferable to obeying the law.
In both cases-justification and excuse-the relevant circumstances
may include the way the actor perceives the world around him, so that if
he is mistaken about what is going on, that must be taken into account.
In the case of involuntary intoxication it is not the circumstances as the
actor believes them to be, but the actual circumstances that determine
the outcome. Duress and related excuses are very similar to justifications
in that it is the circumstances as the actor believes them to be that deter-
mines whether he ought to be punished; they differ in the manner of
appraisal of the action itself.
What makes this distinction a formal one rather than a substantive
one is that it defines both legal excuse and legal justification in terms of
legal punishment and legal preferability rather than, for example, in
terms of the proportion of harm to benefit created by the action. The
decision as to what is legally preferable is one for the legislature and the
courts: it may be legally preferable to create an excess of good over
harm, and it may not be. But, assuming I have got the distinction right,
it is not within the authority of the legislature or the courts to modify the
distinction itself: if the relationship of excuse to justification is as I have
described it, then it is part of the nature of the criminal law.
III. CONCLUSION
The important point is not the suggested distinction between justifi-
cation and excuse, but rather the focus on the formal distinction rather
than the applied distinction. In a jurisdiction in which no action is ever
justified or excused, the range of application of the two notions will be
exactly the same. It must be clear that sameness of application in that
empty sense is irrelevant to the question of the distinction between justifi-
cation and excuse. Or perhaps it is better to say that it is irrelevant to at
least one important question about the distinction.
Is there any practical point to all this? One reason why Fletcher
was interested in the relation between justification and excuse and the
right to resist was that it showed that the distinction between justification
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and excuse had a practical application. Is there a similar significance to
be attributed to whatever turns out to be the correct formal distinction
between the two? The formal distinction has profound practical signifi-
cance, in a way I have already suggested: the very act of comparing
justification in one jurisdiction with justification in another presupposes a
good grasp of the logic and meaning of justification.

